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IMPACT OF RICHARD A. EPSTEIN

James W. Ely, Jr.

It is a widely accepted premise that Professor Richard A. Epstein has exercised
a pervasive influence on American legal thought. In a much quoted statement, Dean
William Michael Treanor, for instance, has declared: "[a]lmost certainly, in recent
years Professor Richard Epstein has influenced political discourse about the Takings
Clause more than any other academic." 1 Another observer asserted that Professor
Epstein "provided the intellectual framework for the property rights movement. ' 2 In
a dramatic movement, Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., held up Epstein' s book on takings
and repeatedly interrogated Supreme Court nominee Clarence Thomas as to whether
he agreed with Epstein's position regarding the constitutional protection of economic rights.3 In 2001, a prominent law professor claimed that "in recent years it
appears that scholarship by those on the Right... has had more profound effects
on social policy than has scholarship by those on the Left."4 To support this contention he cited Epstein's book on takings.'
It should be noted that many of these assertions about Epstein's supposed influence have been advanced by his critics. They seem to almost delight in picturing
Epstein as a gray eminence whose nefarious views are poisoning the legal culture.
But more sympathetic observers have also trumpeted his impact. Henry G. Manne,
* Milton R. Underwood Professor of Law and Professor of History, Vanderbilt University.
I am grateful to David E. Bernstein, Mark E. Brandon, Alfred L. Brophy, Adam Mossoff, and
Michael P. Vandenbergh for perceptive comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I also wish to
acknowledge the skillful research assistance of Stephen Jordan and Janet Hirt of the Massey
Law Library of Vanderbilt University.
William Michael Treanor, The OriginalUnderstandingof the Takings Clause and the
PoliticalProcess, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 815 (1995); see also William Michael Treanor,
TranslationWithout Fidelity:A Response toRichardEpstein'sFidelity Without Translation,
1 GREEN BAG 2D 177 (1998) ("Few legal scholars can even dream of having the effect that
Richard Epstein has had on law and on politics, and his remarkable influence is probably
greatest in the area of takings law.").
2 Ed Carson, PropertyFrights:Why PropertyRights InitiativesAre Losing at the Polls,
REASON, May 1996, at 27, 28.
3 Nomination of Judge ClarenceThomas to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 113-15,

127, 397 (1991) (statements of Sen. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman, S. Comm. on the
Judiciary). The incident is recalled in Jeffrey Rosen, The UnregulatedOffensive, N.Y. TIMEs,
Apr. 17, 2005, § 6 (Magazine), at 42.
4 Richard 0. Lempert, Activist Scholarship, 35 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 25, 28 (2001).
5 Id.
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for example, insisted in 1988 that Epstein was "already beginning to have a substantial influence on a new debate" over economic rights.6
How accurate are these claims? Any attempt to measure the impact of a particular
scholar is fraught with hazard. There are no easy or mechanical guideposts by which
to assess a person's influence on judges, legislatures, or the legal culture generally.7
It seems fair to conclude that most legal scholarship has no impact whatsoever.8 Despite these cautionary comments, I hope in these brief remarks to evaluate Professor
Epstein's influence upon current legal thought regarding the rights of property owners
within our constitutional scheme.
I start by assessing his impact on judicial decisions pertaining to property rights.
For years, Professor Epstein has been the leading academic spokesman in support
of a more vigorous interpretation of the property clauses of the Constitution. His primary focus has been upon the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Yet, contrary to the commentators noted above, one must conclude that Epstein's impact
upon judicial decisions interpreting this clause has been slight. The Supreme Court
has rarely cited Epstein's work and then only in connection with peripheral or noncontroversial points.9 Citations of his leading work, Takings: PrivatePropertyand
the Powerof Eminent Domain,by lower federal and state courts have similarly been
infrequent. Even when cited by courts, it is far from clear that the work had a decisive influence on the outcome of particular cases.'0 In fact, several judicial opinions
comment on Epstein's views only to reject them." A line of celebrated regulatory
takings decisions, from Nollan v. CaliforniaCoastalCommission 2 through Dolan
v. City of Tigard,13 however welcome to property rights enthusiasts, fell well short
of adopting Epstein's analysis of takings issues. Epstein's argument that rent control
Henry G. Manne, Introduction, GEO. MASON U. L. REv., Winter 1988, at 1,3.
7 For instructive studies of the difficulties in assessing the influence of towering figures,
see M. Todd Henderson, The Influence of F.A. Hayek on Law: An Empirical Analysis, 1
N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 249 (2005); Dennis R. Nolan, Sir William Blackstone and the New
6

American Republic: A Study of IntellectualImpact, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 731 (1976).

' One study has concluded that most law review articles are rarely even cited. Posting
of Tom Smith to The Right Coast, http://therightcoast.blogspot.coml2005/07/voice-cryingin-wilderness-and-then.html (July 13, 2005, 14:52).

9 See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606,631 (2001); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council,
505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,
491 n.20 (1987).
10 In several cases the book has been cited rather generally and does not appear to have been
determinative of the outcome. See, e.g., Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d
1171, 1180 n. 12 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist. v. United States, 61 Fed. Cl.
438, 443 (2004).
" See Pittman v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 64 F.3d 1098, 1104 (7th Cir. 1995) (rejecting
Epstein's assertion that contracts are a form of property protected by the Fifth Amendment),
cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1243 (1996).
12 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
13 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
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constitutes a type of regulatory taking 4 has yet to convince courts.' Even during
recent terms, the Supreme Court majority opinions did not betray the slightest in6
fluence of Epsteinian thinking.'
In addition to his efforts to strengthen the regulatory takings doctrine and put
some teeth into the "public use" requirement, Epstein has sharply criticized the determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases.' 7 He has charged that
courts systematically undercompensate owners and approve valuations that do not
make the loser whole.' Such inadequate valuations, of course, undercut the protective function of the Takings Clause. To date, however, courts have not demonstrated any interest in revisiting the contested question of just compensation."
This is not to say that Epstein's impact on the courts has been negligible. One
could, for example, detect the effect of Epstein's views in the dissenting opinions in
Kelo v. City of New London.2 ° In particular, Justice O'Connor's criticism of earlier
decisions conflating the "public use" requirement with the police power mirrors
Epstein's position.2' One observer has maintained that the plurality Supreme Court
decision in Eastern Enterprisesv. Apfe122 "reflects the influence of the libertarian
anti-regulatory policy of scholars like Professor Richard Epstein. ' 23 Moreover, some
14 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT

186-88 (1995) [hereinafter EPSTEIN, TAKINGS]; Richard A. Epstein, Rent Control
and the Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 741, 742-50 (1988).
"sSee, e.g., Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. N.Y. State Div. of Hous. & Cmty.
Renewal, 83 F.3d 45, 47 (2d Cir. 1996) (specifically rejecting Epstein's position).
16 See James W. Ely Jr., "Poor Relation" Once More: The Supreme Court and the
Vanishing Rights of PropertyOwners, 2004-2005 CATO SUP.CT. REV. 39 (analyzing and
criticizing the Supreme Court's property decisions during the 2004-2005 term).
17Richard A. Epstein, In and Out of Public Solution: The Hidden Perilsof Forcedand
Unforced Property Transfer, in PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFUCT, AND LAW
316, 317 (Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney eds., 2003).
18 EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 14, at 182-86; Epstein, supra note 17, at 317-21.
'9 See generallyBruce L. Benson, The Mythology of Holdoutasa JustificationforEminent
Domain and PublicProvisionofRoads, 10 INDEP. REV. 165, 181-85 (2005) (criticizing undervaluation in eminent domain proceedings); Gideon Kanner, When Is "Property"not "Property
Itself': A CriticalExamination of the Bases of Denialof Compensationfor Loss of Goodwill
in Eminent Domain, 6 CAL. W. L. REV. 57 (1969); Thomas W. Merrill, Incomplete Compensationfor Takings, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 110, 115-20, 128 (2002) (noting that the fair
market value test "generates a relatively stingy award relative to other possible standards").
20 545 U.S. 469, 494-523 (2005) (O'Connor & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
21 Compare EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 14, at 178-79 (noting that the "public use"
requirement needs either a public good or universal right of access not just a state's police
power), with Kelo, 545 U.S. at 501-02 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that "public use" does
not always equate to police power).
DOMAIN

22

534 U.S. 498 (1998).

Lisa R. Strauss, Note, The Takings Clause as a Vehicle for JudicialActivism: Eastern
Enterprises v. Apfel Presents a New Twist to Takings Analyses, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 689,
732-33 (2000).
23
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commentators have asserted that Professor Epstein's work on regulatory takings has
found expression in decisions by the Circuit Court for the Federal Circuit.24 The reversal of the highly controversial Poletown decision by the Michigan Supreme Court
in 2004 also bears traces of Epstein's reading of the "public use" clause.25
Professor Epstein's writings, of course, extend beyond the Takings Clause. If
Epstein has had only limited impact onjudicial treatment of takings claims, his calls
for revitalization of the Contract Clause26 and for renewed protection of economic
rights under the Due Process Clause have fallen entirely on deaf ears.27
Courts have had no opportunity to address Epstein's contention that the progressive income tax rate amounts to an uncompensated taking of property. 2 But this
argument has received little attention and seems highly unlikely to prevail.29
In contrast, I submit that Professor Epstein has had a much larger impact on legal
culture and that intellectual currents generated by his efforts may ultimately affect
judicial behavior. To put this contention in perspective, I invite you to consider the prevailing attitudes toward property rights when Professor Epstein began to address this
subject. The legal realist movement in the early twentieth century had done much to
undermine traditional conceptions of property rights.3" Since the New Deal era, courts
Michael C. Blumm, The End ofEnvironmentalLaw ?LibertarianProperty,NaturalLaw,
and the Just Compensation Clause in the FederalCircuit, 25 ENVTL. L. 171, 192-93 (1995).
' County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004) (overruling Poletown
Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981)). Epstein was a sharp
critic of the Poletown decision. EPsIBIN, TAKINGS, supra note 14, at 179-80.
26 Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization ofthe ContractClause, 51 U. CHI. L. REv.
703 (1984).
27 Richard A. Epstein, The Mistakes of 1937, GEO. MASON U. L. REV., Winter 1988, at
5, 13-20.
28 See EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 14, at 295-305.
29 For a discussion of Epstein's views concerning progressive rate taxation, see Calvin R.
24

Massey, Takings and ProgressiveRate Taxation, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 85 (1996);
Eduardo Moises Pefialver, Regulatory Taxings, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 2182 (2004); Jeffrey
A. Schoenblum, Tax Fairnessor Unfairness?A Considerationof the PhilosophicalBases
for Unequal Taxation of Individuals, 12 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 221, 245-46 (1995).
3 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and
Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 365 (2001).
Notwithstanding these variations, the motivation behind the realists'
fascination with the bundle-of-rights conception was mainly political.
They sought to undermine the notion that property is a natural right,
and thereby smooth the way for activist state intervention in regulating
and redistributing property. If property has no fixed core of meaning, but
is just a variable collection of interests established by social convention,
then there is no good reason why the state should not freely expand or,
better yet, contract the list of interests in the name of the general welfare.
The realist program of dethroning property was on the whole quite
successful. The conception of property as an infinitely variable collection
of rights, powers, and duties has today become a kind of orthodoxy. Not
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by and large had given short shrift to any constitutional challenge to economic regulations.3 Scholarly interest in economic rights was moribund.3 2 Busy attempting
to legitimate the New Deal revolution,33 most scholars applauded the apparent demise
of constitutional protection for the rights of owners.34 The Contract Clause35 and the
Due Process Clause, in so far as the Due Process Clause pertained to economic rights,
were essentially written out of the Constitution. The regulatory takings doctrine, while
recognized in theory by courts, was ignored in practice. There appeared to be no identifiable limit on the power of government to take property for "public use" under the
power of eminent domain. One scholar even maintained that the very concept of private
property had disintegrated and lost its special place in legal thought.3 6 When I was
approached by Oxford University Press to write a short history of property rights
coincidentally, state intervention in economic matters greatly increased
in the middle decades of the twentieth century, and the constitutional
rights of property owners generally receded.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY:
COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY INAMERICAN LEGALTHOUGHT 1776-1970, at 381(1997)
(discussing the impact of legal realists and concluding that "[t]he bundles-of-rights idea also
reflects the insight that ownership is not absolute and autonomous but relative and
relational"); BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEz FAIRE: ROBERT
HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT (1998) (discussing efforts by pro-

gressives and legal realists to recast property rights).
3' JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL

HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 126-34 (2d ed. 1998).
32 James L. Oakes, "PropertyRights" in ConstitutionalAnalysisToday, 56 WASH. L. REV.
583, 608 (1981) (noting that "during a time of expanding social legislation" the rights of owners

"were essentially confined to a legal dust bin").

33 KENI. KERSCH, CONSTRUCTINGCIVILLIBERTIES: DSCONTINuITEs IN THE DEVELOPMENT
OF AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 2 (2004) ("[T]he new constitutional scholarship was

in its very sinews heavily implicated in the political project ofjustifying, institutionalizing, and
(as conditions worked to decay its foundations) defending the New Deal constitutional regime.");
see also David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Originsof
FundamentalRights Constitutionalism,92 GEO. L.J. 1, 2-9 (2003) (criticizing Progressive and

New Deal era historians for tailoring constitutional history to serve political objectives).
34 See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 116 (1991) ("For the first
150 years, few doubted that the Founding Federalists placed a high constitutional value on
private property and market freedom. Since the New Deal had transparently repudiated this
Founding commitment, modem courts would have to find a way of preserving those fragments
of the Founding ideal that had survived the popular repudiation of the property-oriented
conception of limited government.").
"' James W. Ely, Jr., The Protectionof ContractualRights: A Tale of Two Constitutional
Provisions, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 370, 382 (2005) ("The general eclipse of property
rights affected the Contract Clause, which fell into disuse by the Supreme Court for decades.
For all practical purposes, the guarantee of the Contract Clause was now subordinated to
state regulatory authority.").
36 Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegrationof Property,in PROPERTY 69 (J. Roland Pennock
& John W. Chapman eds., 1980).
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in the late 1980s, I seriously questioned in my own mind whether the topic was of
more than purely historical interest.
Professor Epstein was the primary intellectual force in changing the terms of debate
over property in the constitutional order. Once dismissed for advancing strange ideas
that contradicted the conventional wisdom, Professor Epstein has seen his views resonate more widely than his critics expected. The subordination of property, once taken
for granted, is now open to discussion. No thoughtful scholar can address the topic of
regulatory takings without coming to grips with Epstein's arguments. Specifically, his
work has been the catalyst for an outpouring of scholarship on the origins and history
of the Takings Clause.37 It is not too much to conclude that Professor Epstein's work
has triggered a national dialogue on the role of property in American constitutionalism.
The vigor with which critics assail Epstein's views-he has been compared to Thomas
Malthus 3s and derided as a radical reactionary 3 9 -is a backhand testament to their
intellectual appeal and impact.
It bears emphasis that Professor Epstein's influence extends far beyond the academe and the narrow confines of legal literature. He has waged a broad intellectual
offensive on behalf of the rights of property owners. Unlike most scholars, Epstein has
reached a popular audience through lectures and newspaper essays. Indeed, the widespread negative reaction to the recent Kelo decision is partly a tribute to Professor
Epstein. Without his tireless efforts to highlight the importance of property and his
ability to stimulate other scholars to explore issues relating to the rights of owners, it is
unlikely that the public would have perceived so acutely the dangers Kelo posed for
ordinary citizens.4° Even Justice Stevens, striking a somewhat defensive note, felt
" Some of this literature has sought to rebut Epstein by insisting that the Takings
Clause was not originally intended to cover regulation. See, e.g., Matthew P. Harrington,
Regulatory Takings and the Original Understandingof the Takings Clause, 45 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 2053 (2004); John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significancefor
Modem Takings Doctrine,109 HARv. L. REv. 1252 (1996); William Michael Treanor, Note,
The Originsand OriginalSignificance ofthe Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694 (1985). Other scholars have lent support to his position that the Fifth
Amendment includes regulatory takings. See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations,and
Natural Property Rights, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 1549, 1561-93 (2003); Andrew S. Gold,
Regulatory Takings andOriginalIntent: The Direct,PhysicalTakings Thesis "Goes Too Far,"
49 AM. U. L. REV. 181 (1999); Kris W. Kobach, The Origins of Regulatory Takings: Setting
the Record Straight,1996 UTAH L. REv. 1211; Adam Mossoff, What Is Property?Puttingthe
Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REv. 371, 428-36 (2003). See generally James W. Ely,
Jr., "That Due Satisfaction May be Made": The Fifth Amendment and the Origins of the
Compensation Principle,36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1 (1992) (arguing that the Takings Clause
is a safeguard for property owners).
38 Thomas C. Grey, The Malthusian Constitution,41 U. MIAMI L. REv. 21, 22 (1986).
31 William Greider, The Right and US Trade Law: Invalidatingthe 20th Century, THE
NATION, Oct. 15, 2001, at 21.
o For the public reaction, see Tresa Baldas, States Ride Post-'Kelo' Wave ofLegislation,
NAT'L L.J., Aug. 1, 2005, at 1; Joi Preciphs, Eminent-Domain Ruling Knits Rivals-High
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compelled to explain that he really was not comfortable with the outcome in Kelo
and thought that private market forces should be sufficient in most situations to
achieve economic development. 4
Aside from helping to transform the dialogue over property rights, Professor
Epstein has played a key role in challenging the statist Progressive/New Deal consensus that has dominated historical scholarship for decades. His assaults on the
welfare state and redistributionist programs have done much to reopen debate about
the New Deal legacy. As Bruce A. Ackerman correctly pointed out, a vigorous
reading of the Takings Clause "clearly threatens the new economic order wrought
by Roosevelt, whose legitimacy forms the very bedrock of post-New Deal constitutional law."42 Revisionists have called into question long-standing assumptions
about the legitimacy of the regulatory state and have begun to reclaim the pre-1937
tradition of judicial solicitude for the rights of property owners.43 This growing body
of historical literature has taken several forms. Some scholars have challenged the
standard celebratory accounts of the New Deal and offered a negative assessment
of its impact on economic freedom." A number of volumes provide a more favorable treatment of pre-New Deal jurists who sought to safeguard economic rights by
limiting the reach of government.45 David Bernstein's provocative book provides
historical evidence to vindicate Epstein's argument that licensing laws and labor
regulations promoted by progressives harmed economic opportunities for blacks.46
In a magisterial work, Richard Pipes has emphasized the pivotal role of private property in the growth of democratic institutions and protection of individual rights."
Court'sDecision Puts Conservativesand LiberalsTogether,as Both Sides See Threats, WALL
ST. J., July 8, 2005, at 4A. As of this writing, at least twenty-four states have enacted legislation to reign in the use of eminent domain for economic development purposes. The National
Conference of State Legislatures is tracking state eminent domain legislation enacted in
reaction to Kelo. See National Conference of State Legislatures, Eminent Domain: 2006
State Legislation, Sept. 12, 2006, http://www.ncsl.org/program/natres/postkeloleg.htm. In addition, the House of Representatives, by a vote of 365 to 33, adopted a resolution expressing
its "grave disapproval" of the majority opinions in Kelo. H.R. Res. 340, 109th Cong., 151
CONG. REC. H. 5592 (2005) (enacted).

"' Linda Greenhouse, Justice Weighs Desirev. Duty, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25,2005, at Al.
BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION

149 (1977).
ELY, supra note 31, at 134; MICHAEL J. PHILLIPS, THE LOCHNER COURT, MYTH AND
REALITY: SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS FROM THE 1890s TO THE 1930s (2001).
42

"'

44 JIM POwELL, FDR'S FOLLY: How ROOSEVELT AND HIs NEW DEAL PROLONGED THE

GREAT DEPRESSION (2003).
45 See HADLEY ARKES, THE RETURN OF GEORGE SUTHERLAND: RESTORING A JURIS-

PRUDENCE OF NATURAL RIGHTS (1994); JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF
MELVILLE W. FULLER, 1888-1910 (1995); Joseph Gordon Hylton, DavidJosiah Brewer: A
ConservativeJustice Reconsidered, 1994 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 45.
46 DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, ONLY ONE PLACE OF REDRESS: AFRICAN AMERICANS, LABOR
REGULATIONS, AND THE COURTS FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE NEW DEAL (2001).
47 RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM (1999).
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Even some liberal scholars have questioned the disparagement of property rights
and noted the link between economic and personal liberties.4 8
Epstein's call for a new analysis of takings law and property rights generally
have contributed significantly to a re-evaluation of constitutional jurisprudence.
Prevailing legal norms, however, stop far short of Epstein's vision. The standard
account of a triumphant New Deal, although bruised and somewhat on the defensive, retains considerable force among scholars. Still, few can match Epstein's
achievements in questioning conventional wisdom and energizing a long dormant
dialogue over property rights in American constitutionalism. Moreover, the final
returns concerning impact are not yet available. As that great philosopher Yogi Berra
reminded us: "[ilt ain't over 'til it's over."'4 9 It is entirely possible that the long
range influence of Professor Epstein on law and policy shall prove to be considerable.

Walter Dellinger, The IndivisibilityofEconomicRights and PersonalLiberty, 2003-2004
CATO SUP. CT. REv. 9.
49 PAUL DICKSON, BASEBALL'S GREATEST QUOTATIONS

43 (1991).

